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The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets 
him free.  Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its 
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter 
of its own existence.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Referring to the exclusionary rule implicit in the Fourth 
Amendment, Justice Clark seemingly predicts the future Minnesota 
case of State v. Jackson.2  The Jackson case addresses the overarching 
issue of whether a statutorily invalid nighttime search implicates 
the Fourth Amendment which, in turn, provides a separate and 
independent basis of suppression apart from statutory 
considerations.3  Although officers found methamphetamine while 
searching Jackson’s home, and she was later found guilty of 
numerous crimes, she went free on what appears to be a 
technicality—the search was conducted in violation of a Minnesota 
statute prohibiting most nighttime searches,4 making it 
‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment and requiring 
suppression of the seized evidence through the exclusionary rule.5
The Jackson decision is noteworthy because the United States 
Supreme Court has never directly decided whether a statutorily 
invalid nighttime search implicates the Fourth Amendment and its 
underlying remedies.
 
6  Lower courts directly deciding the issue are 
split.7
 
 1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (Clark, J.). 
 2. 742 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 2007). 
 3. See id. at 167 (discussing Jackson’s claim that the statutorily invalid 
nighttime search of her home violated her Fourth Amendment rights, requiring 
suppression). 
 4. See MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (2006). 
 5. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166, 176–80. 
 6. Jeffry R. Gittins, Comment, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Extending the 
Rationale of Hudson v. Michigan to Evidence Seized During Unauthorized Nighttime 
Searches, 2007 BYU L. REV. 451, 468 (2007).  See also infra Part II.C.1. 
  Thus, no universal framework for analysis exists.  Yet the 
 7. Compare United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 
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Minnesota Supreme Court held that searches conducted in 
violation of Minnesota’s nighttime search statute may implicate the 
Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule.8  Although Jackson 
lets a guilty person go free, the decision is supported by history, 
precedent, and most importantly, the Fourth Amendment.9
This case note will first explore America’s particular aversion 
toward nighttime searches, both before and after ratification of the 
Fourth Amendment.
 
10  The note then discusses the Supreme 
Court’s development of the basic Fourth Amendment analytical 
framework, followed by the evolution of federal and state nighttime 
search jurisprudence.11  Next, the Jackson decision is discussed in 
detail,12 followed by an in-depth analysis of the decision, applying 
the Fourth Amendment analytical framework to highlight the main 
flaw in the court’s reasoning.13  Last, this note concludes that the 
Fourth Amendment can provide a separate and independent basis 
for suppression and therefore Jackson was correctly decided.14
II. HISTORY 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that: 
 
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
search and persons or things to be seized.15
 
1968) (concluding nighttime home searches may be a significant factor in 
determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment), and State v. Garcia, 
45 P.3d 900, 904 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (noting jurisdictions are split on whether 
execution of an invalid nighttime search warrant implicates constitutional rights), 
with United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding 
particular procedures required under nighttime search statutes are not part of the 
Fourth Amendment), and Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 
(Mass. 1992) (noting many courts have rejected that nighttime search limitations 
have any basis in the constitution). 
 8. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 174 (citing State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839–40 
(Minn. 1978)). 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Ratified in 1791, the amendment was born out of two English 
colonial practices—the use of general warrants and writs of 
assistance.16  Even so, the Fourth Amendment contains no explicit 
language prohibiting nighttime searches.17
A. The Nighttime Search Aversion 
  Yet, history shows that 
Americans look upon nighttime intrusions with particular distaste. 
Prior to 1750, nighttime searches were astonishingly common 
in the American colonies.18  Although English general warrants 
prohibited nighttime execution, this exception was ignored in 
America until the mid-eighteenth century.19  Execution of writs of 
assistance, however, was always limited to daytime.20  In any event, 
by the 1780s every state but Delaware enacted statutes prohibiting 
nighttime searches.21
The founding fathers also valued their nighttime in-home 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse of power in the matter of searches 
and seizures both in England and the colonies . . . .”).  See Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981).  General warrants lost their footing in America 
during the mid-1760s because of colonial legislation, execution methods, and the 
“intellectual legacy denouncing those methods.”  Id. at 220.  Writs of assistance lost 
their footing shortly after “Paxton’s case” was decided in 1761.  See David E. 
Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 1051, 1067 (Dec. 2004) (citing William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: 
Origins and Original Meaning 75 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Claremont Graduate School) (noting after Paxton’s case “colonial courts issued 
the writs sporadically and customs officers never executed the writs effectively.”).  
See also Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 925, 945 (Dec. 1997) (citing O. M. DICKERSON, WRITS OF ASSISTANCE AS 
A CAUSE OF THE REVOLUTION, IN THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (Richard 
B. Morris ed., 1939)) (“[H]istorians have described resistance to the writs as a 
major cause of the Revolution.”).  Historically used to search and seize libelous 
materials, general warrants merely specified an offense, leaving the decision of 
where to search and whom to arrest to the discretion of the official executing the 
warrant.  Maclin, supra, at 1066–67 (citing Cuddihy, supra at 1040).  Writs of 
assistance gave unfettered discretion to the customs officers who carried them out, 
subjecting anyone to home or personal invasion by the Crown at any time. 
 17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18. Maclin, supra note 16, at 971 (citing Cuddihy, supra note 16, at 865–66). 
 19. See id. at 940 (citing Cuddihy, supra note 16, at 425–26) (noting the 
Virginia colony required execution of general warrants during daylight hours by 
1745). 
 20. Gittins, supra note 6, at 467–68 (citing O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 
F.2d 1465, 1473 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 21. Maclin, supra note 16, at 971 (citing Cuddihy, supra note 16, at 1346 
n.228). 
4
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privacy.22  Even the first Congress, prior to ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment, expressed its disapproval of nighttime intrusions by 
passing two acts prohibiting nighttime searches.23  After their 
enactment, “the reluctance to authorize nighttime searches except 
under exceptional circumstances continued as an integral part of 
our jurisprudence.”24  Much of this jurisprudence seems to focus on 
federal and state laws limiting execution of search warrants to 
daytime hours.25
One such federal law was the Espionage Act of 1917, requiring 
government officials applying for a nighttime warrant to be positive 
that the property to be seized was on the premises.
 
26  In 1946, 
certain provisions of the Act were replaced by the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.27  By 1972 and still to this day, Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41 requires an additional showing over and 
above Fourth Amendment probable cause for issuance of a valid 
nighttime search warrant.28
In Jones v. United States,
 
29 decided in 1958, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Rule 41’s additional nighttime search justification.30  
The search in Jones was conducted around 9 p.m., after dark, with 
an expired daytime warrant.31
 
 22. For example, in 1774 John Adams declared: 
[E]very English[man] values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride and 
he glories justly in that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that 
delightful Tranquility which the Laws have thus secured to him in his 
own House, especially in the night.  Now to deprive a Man of this 
Protection, this quiet Security in the dead of Night, when himself and 
Family confiding in it are asleep, is treat[ing] him not like an 
Englishman not like a Freeman but like a Slave . . . .   
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 137 (Worth & Zobel eds., The Belknap Press 1965). 
 23. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d at 898.  The laws were: Act 
of July 31, 1789, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 and Act of March 3, 1791, § 29, 1 Stat. 206.  Id.  
The Fourth Amendment was ratified on December 15, 1791.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
 24. United States ex rel. Boyance, 398 F.2d at 898. 
 25. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 620 (1940). 
 27. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 463 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 463–64.  Today’s version of Rule 41 requires a warrant applicant to 
provide the issuing judge “good cause” to issue a nighttime warrant otherwise the 
warrant must be executed during the day.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(ii). 
 29. 357 U.S. 493 (1958). 
 30. Id. at 498–99. 
 31. Id. at 495. 
  Unsurprisingly, the Court held the 
search invalid, but not before noting that nothing could be “a more 
severe invasion of privacy than [a] nighttime intrusion into a 
5
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private home.”32  Justice Frankfurter has even compared nighttime 
searches to “evil in its most obnoxious form.”33
States have also shown their aversion towards nighttime 
searches.  State common law does not expressly prohibit such 
searches but does look upon them unfavorably.
 
34  This aversion 
results from revulsion at the indignity of rousing people from their 
beds.35  Moreover, the common law regards nighttime police 
intrusions as a great threat to privacy, destructive of home sanctity, 
and a danger to police and slumbering citizens.36  Yet 
Massachusetts, for example, has expressly authorized nighttime 
searches by statute since 1836.37  Upholding the statute in the 1887 
decision of Commonwealth v. Hinds,38 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court opinion still indicates an aversion towards nighttime 
searches.39
Many other states have similar statutes.
 
40  For example, 
Alabama enacted a statute limiting nighttime searches in 1852.41
 
 32. Id. at 498.  See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971) 
(noting nighttime home entries are an “extremely serious intrusion.”). 
 33. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 34. See Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d at 304 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 13 N.E. 397 (Mass. 1887)) (noting a “strong hostility to 
nighttime searches” at common law). 
 35. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 495 N.E.2d 328, 332 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1986)). 
 36. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.7(b), at 266 (2d. ed. 
1987)). 
 37. Id. at 305 (citing Commonwealth v. Garcia, 501 N.E.2d 527, 528 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1986)). 
 38. Hinds, 13 N.E. at 399–400. 
 39. See id.  The statute at issue had four sections. Id. at 399.  The first two 
provided specific situations when a search warrant would issue (e.g., search for 
stolen property). Id.  The third section contained a default daytime execution 
provision. Id.  The fourth section allowed the issuance of a nighttime warrant if 
any of the situations described in the first two sections was present.  Id. at 399–400.  
Thus, an aversion still existed. 
 40. Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Propriety of Execution of Search Warrants at 
Nighttime, 41 A.L.R. 5th 171 (1996).  See also Cipes v. Graham, 386 F. Supp. 2d 34, 
40 n.3 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.7 at 650 
(4th ed. 2004) (“[A] heightened standard for nighttime searches is mandated by 
statute or court rule in 23 states, while 14 states explicitly authorize execution at 
any time, and the remaining 13 states . . . have no pertinent provision.”). 
 41. See ALA. CODE § 15-5-8 (1975). 
  
Even Delaware came to its sense by 1893 when its legislature 
enacted a statute requiring daytime warrants unless an express 
nighttime provision was necessary to prevent “‘an escape, or 
6
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removal of the person, or things, to be searched for.’”42
Minnesota enacted its nighttime search law in 1963.
 
43  Similar 
to other nighttime search statutes, Minnesota’s law prohibits 
searches between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., absent a 
showing of a need to prevent the loss of evidence or to protect 
police or public safety.44  Not surprisingly, the policy of Minnesota’s 
law “is to protect the public from the ‘abrasiveness of official 
intrusions’ during the night.”45
Whether the Fourth Amendment applies in these ‘exceptional 
circumstances,’
 
46 however, remains an anomaly in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence as the Supreme Court has never 
directly decided the issue.47  Nevertheless, if a statute limiting 
nighttime searches is violated and can provide its own basis of 
suppression, then whether the Fourth Amendment can provide a 
separate and independent basis of suppression requires application 
of an elementary Fourth Amendment analysis.48
B. Evolution of General Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
 
Not until 1886 did the Supreme Court decide the first 
important Fourth Amendment case.49  Ever since, “[t]he course of 
true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not—to put it 
mildly—run smooth.”50
 
 42. Petit v. Colomary, 55 A. 344, 345 (Del. 1903) (quoting 97 Del. Laws 737, § 
29 (1893)). 
 43. See MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (2006). 
 44. Id. 
 45. State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 233, 245 N.W.2d 621, 624 (1976) 
(quoting United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1201 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
 46. United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d at 898.  See also supra notes 
23–24 and accompanying text. 
 47. Gittins, supra note 6, at 468. 
 48. See Gooding v. United States, 461 U.S. 430, 461–65 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (discussed infra Part II.C.1). 
 49. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 107 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da 
Capa Press (1970) (republished from 1913 original) (referring to Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).  Before Boyd, less than fifty opinions discussed the 
Fourth Amendment.  Steinberg, supra note 16, at 1072.  Boyd held that a federal 
statute requiring a citizen to turn over certain records on the request of a U.S. 
Attorney constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620–22, 638. 
 50. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
  As such, tracking key Fourth Amendment 
Supreme Court decisions establishing the general Fourth 
7
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Amendment analytical framework is a necessary step to understand 
why statutorily invalid nighttime searches might implicate the 
Fourth Amendment which, in turn, can provide a separate and 
independent basis of suppression. 
1. Fourth Amendment Applicability: Katz v. United States 
As we approach an arguable Fourth Amendment problem we 
should always first ask whether the amendment is applicable.51  
Since the mid-twentieth century, the Fourth Amendment has been 
held to protect personal privacy.52  Although the word privacy 
appears nowhere in the Constitution, the right emanates from 
certain amendments, including the Fourth.53  The seminal case 
linking the Fourth Amendment to a right of privacy and answering 
the applicability question was explored in 1967 in Katz v. United 
States.54
Katz involved the issue of whether law enforcement’s 
electronic tapping of a public telephone booth without a warrant 
constitutes a ‘search’ implicating the Fourth Amendment.
 
55  The 
majority concluded that a search occurred within a protected place 
and therefore a warrant was required.56  However, the Katz majority 
failed to articulate what constitutes a ‘place’ protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.57  Luckily, Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, 
articulated a two-step analysis to answer this question.58
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether a person 
has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” in the 
place.
 
59  The second step is to determine whether that expectation 
is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”60
 
 51. Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, Fourth Amendment Applicability, 16 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 209, 210 (1990). 
 52. Note, Protecting Personal Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 
313, 313 (Dec. 1981). 
 53. Id. at 313 n.2 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 
(1965)). 
 54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 55. Id. at 349–51. 
 56. See id. at 359. 
 57. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
  
Applying the test to the facts of Katz, Justice Harlan first concluded 
that Katz exhibited an actual expectation of privacy when he 
entered the public telephone booth, shut the door behind him, 
8
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and paid the toll.61  Next, Justice Harlan concluded that society is 
prepared to recognize Katz’s expectation as reasonable because a 
public telephone booth is no longer accessible once occupied, with 
the door closed and toll paid.62
Today, Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence is “[t]he touchstone 
of [any] Fourth Amendment analysis.”
 
63  If no expectation of 
privacy exists, there is no ‘search’ and the Fourth Amendment is 
inapplicable.64  But if such an expectation exists, then a court must 
next determine whether the Fourth Amendment is satisfied.65
2. Satisfying the Fourth Amendment: Camara v. Municipal Court 
 
Satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment requires an inquiry into 
whether the search was reasonable, determined by the Camara 
balancing test.66  The Camara decision addressed the issue of 
whether the City of San Francisco’s warrantless housing code-
enforcement inspections violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirement.67  The test articulated by the Court 
requires balancing the government’s need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails.68
The Court held the warrantless administrative searches 




 61. Id. 
 62. See id. (noting a public telephone booth becomes a “temporarily private 
place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are 
recognized as reasonable.”). 
 63. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 64. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (stating that “[i]f the 
inspection by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, 
there is no ‘search’ subject to the Warrant Clause.”). 
 65. Moylan & Sonsteng, supra note 51, at 210. 
 66. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (citing United States 
v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 654 (1979)) (holding that “[o]ur cases show that in determining 
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 (1967)) (noting reasonableness is determined by the 
Camara balancing test). 
 67. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525. 
 68. Id. at 536–37. 
 69. Id. at 534. 
  The Court also 
concluded, however, that the housing code-enforcement 
inspections were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, if a 
9
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valid administrative warrant were first obtained, for three reasons.70  
First, history shows that such inspections are accepted by the courts 
and the public.71  Second, the public’s interest in preventing and 
abating dangerous housing conditions cannot be satisfied without 
inspecting the interior of a private structure.72  Finally, the 
inspections involve a limited invasion of an individual’s privacy 
which is “neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of 
evidence of a crime.”73
Thus, according to Camara, “[i]f a valid public interest justifies 
the intrusion contemplated,” then a judge may “issue a suitably 
restricted search warrant.”
 
74  However, if governmental agents 
search a private dwelling without a valid warrant, they run the 
considerable risk of violating the reasonableness requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment.75  If the Fourth Amendment applies and is 
not satisfied, the next inquiry is whether the unreasonably-obtained 
evidence should be excluded from trial.76
3. Suppression of Unreasonably Obtained Evidence: Weeks v. 
United States and Mapp v. Ohio 
 
Prior to the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United States,77 any 
relevant evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was 
admissible at trial.78
 
 70. Id. at 537. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.   
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 539. 
 75. See id.  See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (quoting 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)) (holding that “‘searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”); United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748–49 
(1984)) (holding that warrantless home searches are presumptively 
unreasonable); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–12 (1981) (same); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (same). 
 76. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (stating “whether the 
exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been 
regarded as an issue separate from . . . whether the Fourth Amendment rights of 
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”). 
 77. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
  However, the Weeks ‘exclusionary rule’ finally 
 78. See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904) (holding that 
common law does not bar admission of illegally seized evidence); United States v. 
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (stating that 
how evidence is obtained does not affect admissibility); Commonwealth v. Dana, 
10
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gave the Fourth Amendment the bite to complement its bark. 
Weeks involved the issue of whether evidence seized by a 
federal agent during a warrantless search, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, should be excluded.79  The Court required exclusion, 
stating that “[i]f [evidence] can thus be seized and held and used 
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value, and, so far as those 
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution.”80  The Court’s holding, however, applied only to the 
federal government.81  In Mapp v. Ohio,82 decided in 1961, the 
Court applied the Weeks exclusionary rule to the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83
4. The ‘Good Faith’ Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: United 
States v. Leon 
 
“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights . . . through its 
deterrent effect.”84  As such, its application is limited to those 
circumstances where its remedial objectives are best served.85  Thus, 
many exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist,86 including the 
‘good faith’ exception first articulated in United States v. Leon.87
Simply put, evidence obtained with a search warrant later 
found invalid is admissible if the officers who applied for, and 
executed the warrant, had an objectively reasonable good faith 




43 Mass. 329, 337 (1841) (stating that the court was not concerned with legality of 
seizure, only relevance of evidence). 
 79. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389. 
 80. Id. at 393. 
 81. Id. at 398. 
 82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 83. Id. at 655–56. 
 84. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (establishing the 
‘knock-and-announce’ exception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) 
(establishing the ‘inevitability of discovery’ and ‘independent source’ exceptions); 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (establishing the ‘fruit of 
the poisonous tree’ doctrine). 
 87. 468 U.S. 897, 923–24 (1984). 
 88. Id. at 922–23. 
  Thus, if “the officers were 
dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have 
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of 
11
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probable cause,” then the exclusionary rule is still applicable.89  
However, “‘a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to 
establish’ that a law enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith 
conducting the search.’”90
With the Fourth Amendment analytical framework in place, 
the question becomes whether any portion of it applies to 
statutorily invalid nighttime searches.  As with the evolution of 
search and seizure law generally, “[t]he course of true law 




C. Evolution of Nighttime Search Jurisprudence 
 
1. Federal Case Law 
A dissenting opinion is the closest the United States Supreme 
Court has come to answering whether a statutorily invalid 
nighttime search implicates the Fourth Amendment.92  Decided in 
1974, Gooding v. United States concerned the issue of whether 
evidence seized during a nighttime search under a federal drug 
enforcement law was valid, and if not, whether suppression was 
required.93  The warrant, which allowed execution “‘at any time in 
the day or night,’” was executed at 9:30 p.m. resulting in the 
seizure of drug contraband.94  The majority held the particular 
search was valid, and therefore suppression was not required.95  
Oddly, the majority never mentioned the Fourth Amendment in its 
analysis.96
Justice Marshall, however, did address the Fourth Amendment 
 
 
 89. Id. at 926. 
 90. Id. at 922 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982)). 
 91. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 92. See Gittins, supra note 6, at 468–69 (noting that Gooding v. United States, 
416 U.S. 430, 431 (1974) is the closest the Supreme Court has come to addressing 
the issue but only Justice Marshall, in his dissent, discussed the constitutional 
implications of nighttime searches). 
 93. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 431.  The federal law at issue provided: “[A] search 
warrant relating to offenses involving controlled substances may be served at any 
time of day or night if the judge or United States magistrate issuing the warrant is 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant 
and for its service at such time.”  Id. at 439 n.8 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) 
(1970)). 
 94. Id. at 442–43. 
 95. Id. at 458. 
 96. See id. at 430–59. 
12
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issues in his dissent.  According to Justice Marshall, the majority 
analyzed the particular nighttime search statute in a “vacuum” and 
was “totally oblivious” to Fourth Amendment considerations.97  
After citing Katz for the proposition that the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect the individual’s reasonable expectations 
of privacy from unjustified governmental intrusion, Justice Marshall 
felt “there is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and more 
demanding of constitutional protection than our right to expect 
that we will be let alone in the privacy of our homes during the 
night.”98  Then, referencing Camara, Justice Marshall noted that 
reasonable nighttime searches require an additional justification 
above Fourth Amendment probable cause.99  However, as the 
petitioner in Gooding never claimed Fourth Amendment 
protection, Justice Marshall and the majority viewed the cases as 
one of statutory interpretation.100
Lower federal courts have confronted similar situations, with 
mixed results.  For example, in United States ex rel. Boyance v. 
Myers,
 
101 decided six years before Gooding, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals concluded the time of execution may be a significant 
factor in determining reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment.102  However, in United States v. Searp,103 decided four 
years after Gooding, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held the 
particular procedures required by nighttime search statutes are not 
part of the Fourth Amendment.104  Thus, lower federal courts are 
split on the issue.  The states are no different.105
 
 97. Id. at 461–62 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 462. 
 99. Id. at 464–65.  See also, United States v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d 74, 77 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (establishing that the time of search is relevant to whether the search is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 
1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that nighttime searches are “sensitively 
related to the reasonableness issue.”). 
 100. Gooding, 416 U.S. at 465 (majority opinion). 
 101. 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 102. Id. at 897. 
 103. 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 104. Id. at 1124. 
 105. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992) 
(noting numerous courts have rejected that nighttime search limitations have any 
basis in the Constitution); State v. Garcia, 45 P.3d 900, 904 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2002)(noting jurisdictions are split on whether the execution of an invalid 
nighttime search warrant implicates constitutional rights). 
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2. Minnesota Case Law 
Minnesota’s first foray into the debate began with State v. 
Lien,106 decided on both statutory and constitutional grounds.107  In 
September 1977, police officers obtained a nighttime search 
warrant which was later found invalid under Minn. Stat. section 
626.14.108  The officers arrived at Lien’s residence at 8:50 p.m. and 
watched the people come and go from Lien’s apartment while 
preparing to execute the warrant.109  When Lien arrived home 
shortly after 9:00 p.m., the officers executed the warrant, entering 
through an open door.110  During the search, officers seized 
marijuana and Lien was later charged with possession of a 
controlled substance.111
At trial, Lien moved to suppress the evidence seized during the 
search.
 
112  The district court suppressed the evidence after 
concluding that the affidavit on which the warrant was based lacked 
a sufficient factual showing to justify a nighttime search.113
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
 
114  The court relied 
considerably on Justice Marshall’s Gooding dissent, concluding that 
nighttime searches may have a constitutional dimension.115  
Specifically, the Lien court noted that Justice Marshall “believed the 
Constitution required additional justification for a nighttime 
search... over and above the ordinary showing of probable cause.”116  
Thus, the court reasoned that section 626.14 requires a showing 
that only a nighttime search can be successful.117  Since the affidavit 
failed to state that Lien would not be home during the day, the 
police failed to make a sufficient showing to justify a nighttime 
search under section 626.14, and the warrant was therefore 
invalid.118  Even so, the court allowed the evidence.119
 
 106. 265 N.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Minn. 1978). 
 107. Id. at 839–40. 
 108. Id. at 835–36. 
 109. Id. at 836. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  at 835–36. 
 112. Id. at 835. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 839 (citing Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 461–65 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 116. Id.  (citing Gooding, 416 U.S. at 461–65). 
 117. Id. at 840 (citing State v. Van Wert, 294 Minn. 464, 199 N.W.2d 514 
(1972)). 
 
 118. Id. at 836 (describing the form completed by the officer applying for the 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/4
  
666 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
Suppression was unnecessary for two reasons.  First, the 
violation of section 626.14 was technical in nature.120  And second, 
the judge’s error in granting the nighttime search warrant on the 
officer’s bare assertions was not of a constitutional nature.121  The 
Lien court’s reasoning seems to rest on the particular facts of the 
case.  The statutorily invalid nighttime search warrant “was 
executed at a reasonable hour when most people are still awake.”122  
Moreover, “[t]he police knew [Lien] had just returned home, was 
fully clothed, there was considerable activity in his apartment, and  
. . . [Lien’s apartment] door was partly open.”123  Thus, a mere 
technical violation of section 626.14 occurred and, as a result, the 
Fourth Amendment was inapplicable.124
Although Lien discusses the constitutional implications of a 
nighttime search, the court never concluded whether the Fourth 
Amendment provides a separate and independent basis of 
suppression when a serious violation of section 626.14 occurs.  In 
2007, the court answered “the question left open in Lien, when 




III. THE JACKSON DECISION 
 
A. Facts 
At 9:25 p.m. on December 11, 2003, Itasca County police 
officers executed a nighttime search warrant on Susan Jackson’s 
home.126  After entering through a closed door, the officers 
discovered Jackson and her two children sitting at their kitchen 
table.127  The officers handcuffed Jackson, demanding that she lead 
them to any illegal drugs in her home.128
 
warrant, which stated that a nighttime search was “necessary to prevent the loss, 
destruction, or removal of the objects of the search because it is unknown when 
[Lien] will be at the premises described herein.”). 
 119. Id. at 840–41. 
 120. Id. at 841. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2007) (referring to State v. 
Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 2007)). 
 126. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
  Eventually, Jackson led 
15
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police to multiple locations within her home containing 
methamphetamine.129
Rewind three hours.  At 6:30 p.m. an Itasca County police 
investigator conducting a narcotics investigation involving Todd 
Dawson and Susan Jackson executed a valid search warrant on 
Dawson’s car after he left Jackson’s home.
 
130  The investigator 
discovered a large amount of methamphetamine and other drug 
paraphernalia.131  Based on this evidence and information from 
Dawson and a “confidential reliable informant,” the investigator 
applied for the warrant to search Jackson’s home.132  The 
investigator also requested a nighttime search authorization per 
section 626.14.133  The district court judge granted the 
authorization on the investigator’s assertion that his investigation 
led him “‘into the nighttime [sic] scope of search warrant.’”134
B. Procedural History 
 
Jackson was charged with numerous crimes.135  Prior to trial, 
Jackson moved to suppress the seized evidence.136  She argued that 
the investigator’s “affidavit failed to articulate a sufficient basis to 
support a nighttime search” in violation of section 626.14 and both 
the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.137  The district 
court agreed but denied Jackson’s motion.138
 
 129. Id. at 166–167.  Officers seized approximately 9.7 grams of 
methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia. 
 130. Id. at 166. 
 131. Id.  The investigator discovered fifty-three grams of methamphetamine, a 
large amount of cash, a digital gram scale, and plastic baggies.  Id. 
 132. Id.  The investigator’s affidavit indicated the confidential reliable 
informant saw Dawson drop-off methamphetamine at Jackson’s home and Jackson 
sold methamphetamine.  Id.  Dawson told the investigator he was staying at 
Jackson’s and the two were dating.  Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 165, 167.  Jackson was charged with two counts of second-degree 
controlled substance relating to the possession and sale of methamphetamine 
under Minnesota Statute section 152.022, subdivisions 1(1), 2(1) (2006) and two 
counts of child endangerment under Minnesota Statute section 609.378, 
subdivision 1(b)(2) (2006).  Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 167.  Jackson’s argument was based on article I, section 10 of the 
Minnesota Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Id. at 174–75.  Both provisions are exactly the same.  Compare U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV, with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 138. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 167. 
  The court ruled the 
nighttime search warrant violation was statutory, rather than 
16
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constitutional, and therefore suppression was unnecessary under 
the circumstances.139  At trial, Jackson was found guilty on all 
charges.140  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed.141
C.  The Jackson Majority 
 
1. Statutory Suppression 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.142  The court first 
addressed Jackson’s statutory suppression argument.143  Noting that 
only serious statutory violations “‘which subvert the purpose of 
established procedures’” require suppression, the court concluded 
the purpose of section 626.14 is to protect an individual’s interest 
in being free from intrusion during a period of nighttime repose.144  
The court further indicated that its definition of the interest 
protected by section 626.14 is highly fact-specific.145
Here, police entered Jackson’s “Minnesota home at 9:25 p.m. 
on December 11 when it would have been dark for several 
hours.”
 
146  Furthermore, the investigator’s affidavit failed to show a 
reasonable suspicion that a nighttime search was necessary to 
preserve the evidence or protect the police or public.147  Thus, the 
search amounted to a serious violation of section 626.14 and 
suppression was required.148
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 165–66, 167. 
 141. Id. at 166, 167.  See also State v. Jackson, No. A05-247, 2006 WL 463576 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2006). 
 142. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 180. 
 143. Id. at 167–74 (discussing suppression under Minn. Stat. § 626.14 (2006)). 
 144. Id. at 168, 171 (quoting State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn. 1993)).  
The court based its definition of the interest protected by section 626.14 in large 
part on the historical aversion towards nighttime searches.  Id. at 169.  The court 
also quoted some definitions of “repose” including: “‘the state of being at rest,’ 
‘[f]reedom from worry; peace of mind,’ and ‘[c]almness; tranquility.’”  Id. at 171 
(quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1480 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 145. See id. at 171.  The court explained that the right to protection under 
section 626.14 “will depend ‘on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.’”  Id. (quoting Youngstown 
Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 146. Id. at 172. 
 147. Id.  Meeting the nighttime authorization pursuant to section 626.14 
requires that officers establish a “reasonable suspicion that a nighttime search is 
necessary to preserve evidence or to protect officer or public safety.”  Id. at 167–68 
(citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006)).  Also, the state 
conceded the warrant was statutorily invalid.  Id. at 167, 172. 
 148. Id. at 172, 174. 
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Although the search clearly violated section 626.14, the court 
still had to address State v. Lien.149  Distinguishing Lien on the facts, 
the majority noted that in Lien, unlike here, officers entered the 
residence through an open door and knew that Lien was not 
sleeping, not engaged in personal behavior he intended to keep 
private, and was fully clothed.150  Thus, officers knew Lien “had not 
entered the period of nighttime repose that section 626.14 was 
intended to protect” before entering his apartment.151  Conversely, 
the officers raiding Jackson’s home had no such information.152
The majority also rejected the state’s argument that after-
acquired information can form a basis to avoid suppression under 
section 626.14.
 
153  The court held that police cannot justify a 
statutorily invalid nighttime search with information discovered 
only after they enter a home, showing the person had not yet 
entered a period of nighttime repose.154  This undermines a 
person’s “statutory right to be free from the ‘abrasiveness of official 
intrusions’ during the night.”155  Thus, a serious, rather than 
technical violation of section 626.14 occurred and suppression was 
required under the statute.156
2. Fourth Amendment Suppression 
 
The court could have based suppression on statutory grounds 
alone, but it also ruled on Jackson’s constitutional argument.157
 
 149. 265 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. 1978). 
 150. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 173 (Minn. 2007)(citing Lien, 265 
N.W.2d at 836, 841). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (quoting State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 233, 245 N.W.2d 621, 
624 (1976)). 
 156. Id. at 174.  
 157. Id.  The majority did so even though a prior Minnesota decision 
recommends against ruling on constitutional issues if a decision may be made on 
other grounds.  See State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 2006). 
  
The court reasoned that the dictates of history, the “Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the especially intrusive nature of nighttime 
searches,” and the “holdings of several federal courts that 
nighttime searches implicate the reasonableness requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment,” require that it take into account the time 
of day in determining “whether a search is reasonable under the 
18
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Fourth Amendment.”158  Moreover, constitutional implications 
underlie section 626.14 as the statute is designed to protect 
individuals from unconstitutional nighttime searches.159
Concluding that the Fourth Amendment was applicable, the 
court next determined the statutorily invalid nighttime search of 
Jackson’s home was ‘unreasonable.’
 
160  The court first stated that a 
reasonable Fourth Amendment nighttime search requires an 
additional justification beyond probable cause.161  The additional 
justification is codified in section 626.14 which allows nighttime 
searches only to prevent a loss of evidence or to protect police or 
public safety.162  Applying the Camara balancing test, the court 
concluded the invasion of privacy a nighttime search entails 
outweighed law enforcement’s need to search Jackson’s home at 
night.163  Since the investigator’s affidavit was insufficient to justify 
inclusion of a nighttime search provision under section 626.14, it 
was also insufficient to meet the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirement.164  Thus, it was unreasonable for 
police to enter Jackson’s home at 9:25 p.m. without any 
information relating to whether Jackson had not entered a period 
of nighttime repose.165
Last, the court held the exclusionary rule was applicable for 
two reasons.
 
166  First, it was objectively unreasonable for police to 
rely on the nighttime search provision of the warrant, included 
only on the investigator’s “bare assertion” that a nighttime search 
was necessary.167  Second, suppression is an acceptable way to deter 
future police conduct of this nature.168
 
 158. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 176–77 (Minn. 2007). 
 159. Id. at 174.  The majority also noted the likely recurrence of the issue.  Id. 
 160. Id. at 177. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  The court also noted that it need not decide the precise time 
“Jackson’s constitutionally protected period of nighttime repose began and 
ended” as the search clearly fell within the protected period.  Id. 
 166. Id. at 178–80. 
 167. Id. at 179.  The majority rejected the dissent’s argument that the Leon 
‘good faith’ exception should apply, noting Minnesota has specifically declined to 
adopt the exception.  Id. at 180 n.10 (citing State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 791 
n.1 (Minn. 1999); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995); State v. 
Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857, 864 n.4 (Minn. 1991); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 
700, 701 n.1 (Minn. 1990)). 
 168. Id. at 179. 
  Thus, “the Fourth 
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Amendment provides a separate and independent basis from . . . 
section 626.14 that requires suppression of the evidence. . . .”169
D.  The Jackson Dissent 
 
1. Statutory Suppression 
Three justices dissented, relying heavily on Lien.170  According 
to the dissent, the similarity of the facts to Lien requires the 
conclusion that the search constituted a technical violation of 
section 626.14, therefore suppression is unnecessary.171  In Lien, as 
here, the police executed a statutorily invalid nighttime search 
warrant.172  Both Lien and Jackson were awake, fully clothed, and 
not in bed.173  Furthermore, execution took place at similar 
times.174  Thus, a “less than an hour-and-a-half technical violation” 
of section 626.14 does not require suppression.175
Although in Lien officers were aware before entering the 
apartment that Lien had not yet entered a period of nighttime 
repose, the dissent argued this fact was immaterial.
 
176  According to 
the dissent, the inquiry should focus on the effect of the statutorily 
invalid nighttime search on occupants of the home, not on whether 
police know, before entering, that the occupants have not entered 
a period of nighttime repose.177  Thus, whether suppression is 
allowed under section 626.14 does not depend on when police 
learned that Jackson was not roused from sleep, but rather if 
Jackson was in fact roused from sleep.178  As Jackson was awake, a 
mere technical violation of section 626.14 occurred and 
suppression is unnecessary.179
 
 169. Id. at 180. 
 170. Id. (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Russell Anderson 
and Justice Gildea also joined in Justice G. Barry Anderson’s dissent.  Id. at 185. 
 171. Id. at 180–81. 
 172. Id. at 181 (citing State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn. 1978)). 
 173. Id. at 181. (citing Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 841). 
 174. Id. at 181.  In Lien, the warrant was executed “shortly after 9 p.m.” Id. 
(citing Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 836).  In Jackson, the warrant was executed at 9:25 p.m. 
Id. at 181. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 172–73 (majority opinion), 181–82 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., 
dissenting); see Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 841 (referring to the police’s level of 
knowledge acquired before entering Lien’s home). 
 177. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 182 (Minn. 2007). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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2. Fourth Amendment Suppression 
The dissent also noted that the decision not to suppress the 
evidence in Lien was based on the conclusion that the error did not 
implicate the Constitution.180  Nevertheless, the dissent still 
addressed, and rejected, the majority’s constitutional analysis.181
According to the dissent, the federal courts’ holdings that 
nighttime searches violate the Fourth Amendment “involved 
searches pursuant to a warrant that either prohibited a nighttime 
search or did not explicitly authorize such a search.”
 
182  Here, the 
police acted pursuant to a warrant with a nighttime authorization 
and therefore the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable.183
Even so, the dissent addressed the suppression issue.
 
184  The 
dissent rejected suppression based on the Leon good faith 
exception, “because suppression would not deter wrongful police 
activity and because the officers reasonably relied on the judge’s 
authorization of the nighttime search.”185  Both the dissent and 
majority point out that “an officer’s reliance on a judge’s mistaken 
determination must be objectively reasonable,” which means “that 
the officer [has] ‘reasonable knowledge of what the law 
prohibits.’”186  However, the dissent believed that it was objectively 
reasonable for the officers to rely on the nighttime search provision 
when the entire affidavit is analyzed.187  Because prior Minnesota 
cases held evidence of drug related activity in an affidavit can justify 
a nighttime search authorization, it was reasonable for the officers 
to rely on the judge’s conclusion that the affidavit justified a 
nighttime search provision.188
 
 180. Id. at 181, 182 (citing Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 841).  The dissent also noted 
that Minnesota courts should avoid constitutional issues if matters can be decided 
otherwise.  Id. at 183 (citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. 2006);  
In re Senty-Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266, 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998)). 
 181. Id. at 183. 
 182. Id. (citing O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(warrant did not authorize nighttime search); United States ex rel. Boyance v. 
Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968) (warrant authorized daytime search only); 
United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1961)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 183–85. 
 185. Id. at 184. 
 186. Id. (quoting Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 n.20 (1984)). 
 187. Id.  In other words, the majority took too narrow of an approach when it 
reached its suppression conclusion based solely on that part of the investigator’s 
affidavit which stated “[t]his investigation has led your affiant into the nighttime 
[sic] scope of search warrant.”  Id. 
 
 188. Id. (citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 928–29 (Minn. 2006); State v. 
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However, unable to garner enough votes for a majority, the 
dissent failed to stop the Minnesota Supreme Court from ruling 
that the search of Jackson’s home seriously violated section 626.14, 
implicating the Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule.189
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JACKSON DECISION 
 
Holding the statutorily invalid nighttime search of Jackson’s 
home also implicates the Fourth Amendment, which, in turn, 
provides a separate and independent basis of suppression.  The 
majority’s conclusion is correct, but its analysis is flawed in one 
critical respect.  The seminal case determining whether the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated under particular facts is eerily absent 
from the Jackson opinion.  The Jackson decision rests mainly on 
Justice Marshall’s Gooding dissent, yet the case contains no mention 
of Justice Harlan’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.190
Justice Marshall, in Gooding, indicated his approval of Justice 
Harlan’s two-part test when he declared “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
was intended to protect our reasonable expectations of privacy 
from unjustified governmental intrusion.”
 
191  When the test is 
applied to Jackson’s facts, the Fourth Amendment is implicated.192  
Once implicated, Jackson’s facts further suggest that the nighttime 
search was unreasonable under the Camara balancing test.193  And 
the unreasonableness of the search requires the conclusion that 
the evidence be suppressed under the Weeks-Mapp exclusionary 
rule, without exception.194  This analysis also shows that the Jackson 
dissent is wrong, both in its conclusion and analysis.195
 
Saver, 295 Minn. 581, 582, 295 N.W.2d 508, 508–09 (1973)). 
 189. Id. at 180. 
 190. The Minnesota Supreme Court has used the test both before and after 
Jackson.  See, e.g., In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 2003) 
(applying Justice Harlan’s two-part test in context of warrantless search of an 
underage drinking party); State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2007) 
(decided later the same day as Jackson but applying Justice Harlan’s two-part test in 
nighttime search context).  Thus, why the Jackson court never applied the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in its constitutional analysis is extremely 
odd, especially when the main point of contention between the majority and 
dissent is whether the Fourth Amendment even applies. 
 191. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
 192. See infra Part IV.A. 
 193. See infra Part IV.B. 
 194. See infra Parts IV.C–IV.D. 
 195. See infra Parts IV.A–IV.D. 
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A. Application of Justice Harlan’s ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’ 
Test 
Again, the first part of Justice Harlan’s two-step test is whether 
a person has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy” in the particular place.196  The facts of Jackson show that 
Ms. Jackson exhibited an expectation of privacy in her home on 
December 11 at 9:25 p.m.197  She was inside, sitting at the kitchen 
table with her two children when the police entered through a 
closed door.198  If a person who occupies a public telephone booth, 
closing the door behind him is “entitled to assume that his 
conversation is not being intercepted,”199 then surely one who 
occupies their private home, closing the door behind her, is 
entitled to assume that the police will not barge in, absent a 
sufficient justification (e.g., a valid warrant).200
Yet this conclusion is not automatic because the first part of 




 196. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 197. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 2007). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 200. Obviously a search of Jackson’s home took place, but the question is 
whether a search subject to the Fourth Amendment took place.  Normally, a search of a 
private home is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 511 (1961) (“‘[A]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right 
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.’”)).  However, here section 626.14 can provide its own 
basis of suppression and by providing Jackson with a separate and independent 
basis of suppression through the Fourth Amendment, the majority risks, as the 
dissent warns, that the constitutional portion of the opinion may be read as dicta.  
Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 183 n.2 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).  Employing 
Justice Harlan’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in the context of a search 
conducted in violation of section 626.14 circumvents this result.  In all search and 
seizure cases, “the person making the Fourth Amendment claim must affirmatively 
show that his or her protected interests as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment 
have been invaded . . . .”  PHILLIP A. HUBERT, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
LAW 112 (2005).  The affirmative showing is made by satisfying Justice Harlan’s 
test.  See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“[A] [Fourth 
Amendment] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
consider reasonable is infringed.”) (emphasis added).  As will be seen, if a technical 
violation of section 626.14 occurs, the fact-specific nature of Justice Harlan’s test 
will prove the Fourth Amendment inapplicable as in Lien.  See infra notes 209–10 
and accompanying text.  But if a serious violation of section 626.14 occurs, as in 
Jackson, the Fourth Amendment will be applicable.  See infra notes 201–03 and 
accompanying text.  See also, infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 201. United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United 
States v. Monie, 907 F.2d 793, 794 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
  Thus, there may be rare 
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times when a person has not exhibited a subjective expectation of 
privacy in their home at night.  However, in the context of a serious 
violation of section 626.14, this is unlikely.  The Jackson majority 
acknowledged this, although in a statutory context: 
[F]or example, if the police search an unlit home at 
3:00 a.m. without proper nighttime authorization, 
they run considerable risk of violating the occupants’ 
interest in being free from intrusion during a 
nighttime period of repose.  But if the police search a 
home at 8:30 p.m. on the summer solstice when the 
doors are open and a party is underway... they are 
much less likely to run the risk of seriously violating 
the occupants’ interest in being free from such 
intrusion.202
Thus, “[b]ecause the factual circumstances of Fourth 
Amendment cases are so diverse, ‘no template is likely to produce 
sounder results than examining the totality of the circumstances in 
. . . .’”
 
203
Police entered Jackson’s home through a closed door without 
any indication of activity either inside or outside the house.
 determining whether the amendment is implicated in the 
context of a nighttime search. 
204  
Presumably lights were on since Jackson and her children were 
sitting at the kitchen table when the police barged in, but nothing 
else indicates that Jackson had not yet entered a period of 
nighttime repose.205  Moreover, the police entered Jackson’s home 
at 9:30 p.m. on December 11, during the winter solstice, when it 
would have been dark for nearly four-and-a-half hours.206
 
 202. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 171 (majority opinion).  The dissent seems to 
agree by recognizing that: 
[i]f different facts are posited, e.g., the occupants of the home are 
asleep at the time the warrant is executed, the warrant does not 
authorize a nighttime search, or there is evidence of what the 
majority fears might happen—that the police are ‘play[ing] the 
odds’ in ignoring the statutory requirements—there is little doubt 
the analysis would change as well. 
Id. at 182 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 203. Cipes v. Graham, 386 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D. Conn. 2005) (quoting United 
States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35 (2003)). 
 204. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166 (majority opinion). 
 205. See id. (noting police discovered Jackson and her two children awake only 
after entering their home). 
  Thus, 
 206. Id.  According to the United States Naval Observatory, the end of civil 
twilight on December 11, 2003 in Grand Rapids, Minnesota (the largest city in 
Itasca County) was at 4:59 p.m.  U.S. Naval Observatory Astronomical Applications 
Dept. Website, Sun and Moon Data for One Day, http://aa.usno.navy.mil/ 
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Jackson exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in being free 
from unjustified governmental intrusion on that day, at that 
particular time. 
Clearly, the first part of Justice Harlan’s two-step test is highly 
fact-specific.207  Yet, if the first step is satisfied, the next step is 
whether society is prepared to recognize the individual’s subjective 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.208  This is a question of law.209  
As the Jackson majority correctly points out, the Fourth Amendment 
must be construed in light of what was deemed unreasonable when 
the amendment was adopted.210
Recalling the historical aversion towards nighttime searches 
indicates that American society has consistently frowned upon 
nighttime searches in particular.
 
211  Since “there is no expectation 
of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional 
protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the 
privacy of our homes during the night,”212
Applying Justice Harlan’s test also shows why the majority’s 
rejection of Lien is correct.  Lien never exhibited a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his apartment when police executed the 
warrant.
 it follows that society is 
prepared to recognize a person’s subjective expectation of being 
free from unjustified governmental intrusions at night as 
reasonable. 
213  People were coming and going, Lien had just arrived 
home, and the door to Lien’s apartment was open when the police 
entered.214
 
data/docs/RS_OneDay.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Sun and Moon 
Data for One Day]. 
 207. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (stating that first “a person [must] have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy.”). 
 208. Id. 
 209. United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing United 
States v. Monie, 907 F.2d 793, 794 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
 210. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 176 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
149 (1925)).  See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1886) (noting 
that “[i]n order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the 
[F]ourth [A]mendment . . . under the terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ 
it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the 
controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England.”). 
 211. See supra Part II.A. 
 212. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 213. State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn. 1978). 
 214. Id. 
  As to the nighttime aspect, the search of Lien’s 
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apartment began around 9:00 p.m. on September 23, when it 
would have been dark for only an hour-and-a-half.215
Since Lien’s facts fail the first part of Justice Harlan’s test, 
whether the second part of the test is satisfied is irrelevant.
  Thus, Lien’s 
facts show the unlikelihood of Lien exhibiting a subjective 
expectation of privacy on that day, at that particular time. 
216  
Therefore, the Jackson dissent is correct that the decision not to 
suppress the evidence in Lien was based on the “conclusion that the 
error was not of a constitutional nature.”217  But, because the facts 
of Jackson show that the error was of a constitutional nature, the 
search requires analysis under the Camara ‘reasonableness’ test.218
B.  Application of the Camara ‘Reasonableness’ Test 
 
According to Camara, a search is reasonable if the 
government’s need to search outweighs the intrusion which the 
search entails.219
As the Jackson majority indicates, section 626.14 articulates the 
‘governmental need’ portion of the test—the government must 
need to search at night to prevent the loss of evidence or protect 
police or public safety.
  Applying the Camara balancing test to the facts of 
Jackson requires the conclusion that the search of Jackson’s home 
was ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment. 
220  This need logically requires an additional 
justification beyond probable cause for a nighttime search warrant 
to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.221  Other 
jurisdictions have similar procedural rules or statutes conditionally 
permitting nighttime searches222 and consistently reach the same 
result.223
 
 215. Id.  According to the United States Naval Observatory, the end of civil 
twilight on September 23, 1977 in Rochester, Minnesota (where Lien’s apartment 
was located) was at 7:34 p.m.  Sun and Moon Data for One Day, supra note 206. 
 216. Justice Harlan’s test is conjunctive, not disjunctive.  See Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 217. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 181 (Minn. 2007) (Anderson, G. Barry, 
J., dissenting). 
 218. See Moylan & Sonsteng, supra note 51, at 210 (noting that when the 
Fourth Amendment is applicable, the next step is to determine whether the 
amendment is satisfied). 
 219. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967). 
 220. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 177 (majority opinion). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Catalano, supra note 40, at 171. 
 
 223. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A)(ii) (“good cause” required for 
nighttime provision in search warrant); Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 
26
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The only evidence the warrant-issuing judge had in support of 
a nighttime search under section 626.14 was the investigator’s bare 
assertion that in his opinion, the evidence led him into the 
nighttime scope of a search warrant.224  Nowhere in the 
investigator’s affidavit did he state that a nighttime search was 
necessary to preserve evidence or protect police or public safety.225  
Arguably, the police or public safety element of section 626.14 
could have been satisfied had Jackson been manufacturing 
methamphetamine in her home,226 but this was not the case.  Thus, 
the investigator never indicated a need to search Jackson’s home at 
night and the nighttime search provision was invalid.227
The Jackson dissent claims that the investigator’s entire affidavit 
must be considered in determining warrant validity.
 
228  Since prior 
Minnesota cases have held that a nighttime search warrant may 
issue when the affidavit attests to drug-related activity, the dissent 
argued the nighttime search warrant was valid here.229  The entire 
affidavit, however, fails to suggest that the investigator believed the 
methamphetamine would be gone by morning or was an imminent 
danger to the police or public.230  Moreover, the cases relied upon 
by the dissent are distinguishable.  In the first case, the affidavit 
specifically stated that the defendant could destroy the evidence, 
thus satisfying section 626.14.231
 
461 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting Congress frequently requires more 
stringent justifications for nighttime searches than daytime searches); Roth v. 
State, 735 N.W.2d 882, 890–91 (N.D. 2007) (N.D. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1)(E) requires 
‘reasonable cause’ for issuance of a nighttime warrant over and above probable 
cause required for daytime warrant); State v. Salley, 514 A.2d 465, 467 (Me. 1986) 
(same under ME. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)). 
 224. See Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166, 177, 179 (discussing investigator’s search 
warrant affidavit). 
 225. See id. at 166 (quoting investigator’s affidavit). 
 226. See United States v. Tucker, 313 F.3d 1259, 1265 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(nighttime execution of search warrant upheld because of significant risk of 
destruction of evidence, personal injuries, and property damage due to volatile 
nature of chemicals and processes in manufacturing methamphetamine). 
 227. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 177.  The state also conceded that the nighttime 
search provision was invalid.  Id. 
 228. Id. at 184 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). 
 229. Id. (citing State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 928–29 (Minn. 2006); State v. 
Saver, 295 Minn. 581, 582, 205 N.W.2d 508, 508–09 (1973)). 
 230. See id. at 166 (quoting investigator’s affidavit). 
 231. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d at 925. 
  In the second case, the affidavit 
explicitly stated that the search be conducted at night because an 
informant witnessed the defendant selling drugs from the trunk of his 
car; therefore the evidence could have been lost or removed from 
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the search location.232
The government’s need to search Jackson’s home at night was 
negligible at best.  Balanced against the invasion which nighttime 
searches entail, the only logical conclusion is that the search was 
‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.  Nighttime 
intrusions are among the most severe invasions of privacy.
  In any event, as the Fourth Amendment 
applies under the facts of Jackson, the dissent’s argument becomes 
even more unpersuasive once the ‘invasion which a nighttime 
search entails’ weight is placed on the scale, even considering the 
entire affidavit. 
233  Such 
intrusions bear directly on the personal nature of activities that 
occur in the nighttime home.234  They violate the sanctity of the 
home and endanger “slumbering citizens.”235  These concerns are 
not alleviated when the person entering the home is a police 
officer executing a search warrant.236  In fact, being subject to law 
enforcement activity at night produces a more anxious and 
threatening atmosphere than during the day.237
C. Application of the Weeks-Mapp ‘Exclusionary Rule’ 
  Therefore, the 
invasion entailed in the nighttime search of Jackson’s home 
outweighed law enforcement’s need to search her home at night 
and was ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment. 
Generally, the application of the exclusionary rule is limited to 
those times when its remedial objectives are best served.238  Thus, 
balancing the costs of suppression against the benefits determines 
the rule’s applicability.239
 
 232. Saver, 295 Minn. at 582, 205 N.W.2d at 508. 
 233. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (“[I]t is difficult 
to imagine a more severe intrusion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a 
private home.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971) (nighttime 
entries into a home are an “extremely serious intrusion.”). 
 234. George E. Dix, Means of Executing Searches and Seizures as Fourth Amendment 
Issues, 67 MINN. L. REV. 89, 150 (1982–83); Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner 
City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON 
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 297, 312 n.60 (2005). 
 235. Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 595 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1992). 
 236. United States v. Smith, 340 F.Supp. 1023, 1029 (D. Conn. 1972). 
 237. Dix, supra note 234, at 150; Leonetti, supra note 234, at 312 n.60. 
 238. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 239. See id. at 349–50 (weighing the potential injury to the role and functions 
of a grand jury against the potential benefits of exclusion); Pennsylvania Bd. of 
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (exclusionary rule only applies 
when its deterrence benefits outweigh its “‘substantial social costs’” (quoting Leon 
v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))). 
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The costs of excluding the evidence seized in the nighttime 
search of Jackson’s home are potentially great.  Jackson’s home 
contained methamphetamine, a highly addictive and dangerous 
narcotic.240  Moreover, Jackson’s two teen-aged children were 
present when the police executed the warrant.241  Jackson risked 
her children becoming two of the 731,000 individuals aged twelve 
or older who abuse methamphetamine.242  Yet Jackson was never 
punished for possession of narcotics or child endangerment, even 
though a jury found her guilty of the crimes, partially because the 
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that suppression was 
necessary to protect her Fourth Amendment rights.243
Although the costs of excluding the seized evidence are 
significant, the benefits of exclusion are greater.  History shows a 
unique aversion towards unjustified nighttime searches,
 
244 and Boyd, 
the first important Fourth Amendment case, strongly encourages 
that this history be taken into account.245  Moreover, and as the 
Jackson majority indicates, suppression is the only way to deter 
future violations of section 626.14.246  Section 626.14 codifies what 
the Minnesota legislature deems a reasonable nighttime search.247  
If law enforcement is allowed to search a home at night because an 
affiant-officer claims section 626.14 is satisfied, then the statute 
should be stricken from the Minnesota Code.248
[T]he idea of the police unnecessarily forcing their 
way into [a home] in the middle of the night—
frequently, in narcotics cases,... —rousing the 
 
Finally, both aforementioned points relate directly to the fact 
that if the evidence were allowed, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
would disregard both its own constitution and the United States 
Constitution.  Justice Marshall’s Gooding dissent notes: 
 
 240. National Institute on Drug Abuse Website, NIDA InfoFacts:  
Methamphetamine at http://www.nida.nih.gov/InfoFacts/methamphetamine. 
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2008) [hereinafter NIDA InfoFacts: Methamphetamine]. 
 241. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 2007). 
 242. NIDA InfoFacts: Methamphetamine, supra note 238. 
 243. See Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 167. 
 244. See supra Part II.A. 
 245. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1886) (discussed supra 
note 210). 
 246. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 179. 
 247. Id. at 174. 
 248. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (noting without an 
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment “might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution.”). 
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residents out of their beds, and forcing them to stand 
by in indignity in their night clothes while the police 
rummage through their belongings does indeed 
smack of a “‘police state’ lacking in the respect for     
. . . the U.S. Constitution.”249
This, according to Justice Clark in Mapp v. Ohio, would erode the 
very foundations of our government.
 
250
D. Inapplicability of the Leon ‘Good Faith’ Exception 
  Thus, suppression was 
required, unless the Leon ‘good faith’ exception applies. 
The Leon ‘good faith’ exception allows the inclusion of 
evidence obtained with a search warrant later found to be invalid, 
so long as the officers who applied for and executed the warrant 
had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that the warrant was 
valid.251  The Jackson majority rejected the dissent’s argument that 
Leon should apply as the court had specifically declined to adopt 
the exception.252  The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has 
never explicitly rejected the Leon good faith exception.253
Generally, police act in good faith when executing a warrant 
issued by a magistrate.
  
Nonetheless, even if Minnesota followed Leon, an exception to the 
exception proves the rule inapplicable under the facts of Jackson. 
254  Yet Leon itself notes that a magistrate 
cannot issue a warrant based on the “‘bare conclusions of 
others.’”255  Thus, the good faith exception is inapplicable when a 
warrant is issued “based on an affidavit that does not ‘provide the 
magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of 
probable cause.’”256
The investigator’s affidavit in Jackson was supported by 
 
 
 249. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-538, at 12 (1969)). 
 250. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
 251. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 898–99 (1984). 
 252. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007). 
 253. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 791 n.1 (Minn. 1999) (declining 
to address state’s request to adopt ‘good faith’ exception); State v. Zanter, 535 
N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1995) (declining to address applicability of a good faith 
exception); State v. Lindsey, 473 N.W.2d 857, 864 n.4 (Minn. 1991) (same); State 
v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 701 n.1 (Minn. 1990) (refusing to address issue 
whether Minnesota should follow Leon). 
 254. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
 255. Id. at 915 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)). 
 256. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239). 
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probable cause for the issuance of a daytime warrant.257  Section 
626.14, however, requires a showing of reasonable suspicion over 
and above probable cause for issuance of a nighttime warrant.258  
Thus, an affiant-officer must show that the evidence may be lost or 
the police or public endangered if the search is not conducted at 
night.259  The investigator’s statement in his affidavit “that ‘[t]his 
investigation has led your affiant into the nighttime [sic] scope of 
search warrant’”260 was a “bare conclusion” that the warrant-issuing 
judge could not rely upon to include the nighttime provision.261
V. CONCLUSION 
  
Therefore, the police in Jackson, especially the investigator who 
obtained the warrant, failed to act in good faith and Leon is 
inapplicable. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the Fourth Amendment 
can provide a separate and independent basis of evidence 
suppression apart from section 626.14.  Therefore, the Jackson 
majority reached the correct conclusion, though missing the first, 
and most critical, step in the analysis—whether the Fourth 
Amendment is even applicable, determined by Justice Harlan’s 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test. 
Although the Jackson dissent is a more appealing outcome, the 
conclusion the majority reaches is the correct one, albeit through a 
flawed analytical framework.  Yet, one must keep in mind what is at 
stake.  Americans place great value on in-home privacy, especially 
during the night.262
 
 257. See State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 2007) (quoting 
investigator’s affidavit which clearly established probable cause). 
 258. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006).  “Reasonable 
suspicion” is defined as “something more than an unarticulated hunch, that the 
officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion 
at issue.” State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 2000). 
 259. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d at 927 (interpreting section 626.14 to require 
reasonable suspicion that a nighttime search is necessary to prevent loss of 
evidence or protect police or public safety). 
 260. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 166. 
 261. See, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas 
City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717, 731–32 (1961) (affidavit stating existence of cause to 
search, with nothing more, insufficient for magistrate to issue valid warrant); 
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933) (same); Byars v. United States, 
273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (same). 
 262. See supra Part II.A. 
  Minnesota in particular has codified this value 
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in section 626.14.263  Violating this statute does not mean that 
suppression is required any time police conduct a nighttime search.  
It simply means that the police must follow the law while enforcing 
it.264  If Minnesota wants to punish people like Susan Jackson, the 
legislature must enact a statute allowing nighttime searches for 
drug-related offenses, similar to other states.265
A guilty person did go free, and although difficult to swallow, 
she went free on the basis of a two-hundred-year-old law—the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
  Without such a 
statute, law enforcement must follow the dictates of section 626.14 
or wait until daytime to search a private residence.  Otherwise, 
police risk implicating the Fourth Amendment, possibly to the 
exclusion of the seized evidence. 
266  By 
providing Susan Jackson with this separate and independent basis 
of suppression, the Minnesota Supreme Court made sure not to 
“disregard the charter of its own existence.”267
 
 263. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 174. 
 264. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959). 
 265. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-8 (1975) (explicitly allowing a nighttime search 
for controlled substance law violations); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1230 (2005) 
(explicitly allowing nighttime searches for suspected controlled substance 
manufacturing). 
 266. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d at 184–85. 
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